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The most salient feature of ﬁnancial dollarization, and the one that causes more concern
to policymakers, is its persistence: even after successful macroeconomic stabilizations,
dollarization ratios often remain high. In this paper we claim that this persistence is connected
to the fact that the participants in the dollar deposit market are fairly heterogenous, and so
is the way they form their optimal currency portfolios. We develop a simple model when
agents diﬀer in their ability to process information, which turns out to be enough to generate
persistence upon aggregation. We ﬁnd empirical support for this claim with data from three
Latin American countries and Poland.
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11 Motivation
Even though dollarization is a relatively new research area, the experiences of many Latin
American and transition economies during the 1990’s has inspired a growing and rich body
of related literature.1 Dollarization is normally associated with the partial substitution of the
domestic currency by a foreign currency (the US dollar) as a store of value, as opposed to
currency substitution which refers to the use of the foreign currency as a medium of exchange.
In this paper by dollarization we mean deposit dollarization2 which leads ultimately to
credit dollarization and hence to the vulnerability of the ﬁnancial system of highly dollarized
countries. As stressed by Cook (2004) and C´ espedes et. al (2004), the eﬃcacy of monetary
policy in small open economies with ﬂexible exchange rates is compromised by the negative
balance sheet eﬀects generated by dollarization. In this case, sudden real depreciations can
have detrimental eﬀects on the economic activity by reducing the net worth of ﬁrms and
generating adverse eﬀects on investment. This situation gives a rationale for a “fear of ﬂoating”
behavior of central banks (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002; Mor´ on and Winkelried, 2005).
One of the most salient features of dollarization, and probably the one that causes more
concern to policymakers, is its persistence. It is well documented that dollarization increases
sharply during episodes of unduly macroeconomic instability and that it remains stubbornly
high even after successful stabilizations.3 A top-of-mind explanation of the hysteresis is lack
of conﬁdence in domestic currency assets as a result of the traumas brought by past inﬂation,
devaluations, banking crises, and so on. This, however, is not very consistent with the strong
macroeconomic fundamentals observed in several highly dollarized countries (notably Peru
and some transition economies in the early 2000’s).
An alternative approach to address this puzzle is to modify existing currency substitution
models based on adjustment costs or network externalities. Guidotti and Rodr´ ıguez (1992),
Sturzenegger (1997) and Uribe (1997) develop models in which the cost of using the dollar
for transactions depends negatively on the currency substitution ratio, so once transactions
get dollarized, there is no beneﬁt to switch back to using domestic currency if others continue
using dollars. An obvious limitation of this approach is that it refers to the medium-of-
exchange and not to the store-of-value function of money. Furthermore, these models rely
heavily on a “ratchet variable”, a knowledge stock that drives the persistence, so although
they explain neatly upward trends of the dollarization ratio, they do not seem useful in
advising policymakers how to dedollarize, as this may imply an implausible reduction of the
knowledge stock.
Ize and Levy Yeyati (2003) provide a diﬀerent framework for modelling dollarization. They use
1 See De Nicol´ o et. al (2005), Levy Yeyati (2006) and the references therein.
2 Sometimes this is known as asset substitution (Reinhart et. al, 2003) or ﬁnancial dollarization (Ize and
Levy Yeyati, 2003).
3 See Guidotti and Rodr´ ıguez (1992), Savastano (1996), Quispe (2000) and Kamin and Ericsson (2003).
2a portfolio selection approach and derive a minimum variance portfolio (MVP) that depends
on the relative volatility of inﬂation and real exchange depreciation rates. Dollarization
would persist even when inﬂation is low and stable insofar as the volatility of real exchange
depreciation is smaller than that of inﬂation. However, this framework is static whereas
persistence is inherently a dynamic phenomenon. In our view, the MVP approach, which
is by now very popular and has proven successful in explaining cross-sectional variation
of dollarization,4 was not designed to deal with dynamics, since the MVP, the underlying
equilibrium level of dollarization, depends on unconditional moments.5
Curiously, a fact that researchers have apparently overlooked is the very nature of the
participants of the dollar deposit market in dollarized economies: dollar depositors are
extremely heterogenous, ranging from large entrepreneurs to small ﬁrms to non-proﬁt
organizations and to individuals (rich and not-so-wealthy).6 Participation costs are virtually
nil because of liberalization, deregulation and, importantly, due to the emergence of informal
currency traders – known as cambistas in many Latin American countries – which beneﬁt
from buying and selling dollars with tighter markups than those in the banking sector.7 A
typical cambista would hold a limited amount of money for business (say, between US$3,000
and US$5,000) as she is aimed to meet the dollar demand for individuals or small ﬁrms,
normally unwilling to pay the higher bank premium to get their savings dollarized.8 All in
all, participation becomes independent of the scale of the transaction and hence widespread.
The aim of this paper is to draw the attention to the fact that heterogeneity of depositors can
easily explain the persistence of ﬁnancial dollarization. As pointed out by Granger (1980),
diﬀerences in individual dynamics lead to aggregate persistence. Thus, as it is reasonable to
expect that the dynamics of the optimal currency portfolio of a ﬁnancial expert diﬀers from
that of a blacksmith, a persistent aggregate dollarization ratio arises naturally. There are of
course various diﬀerences between a ﬁnancial expert and a blacksmith, but provided that both
access the dollar deposit market almost for free, the relevant diﬀerence to our analysis centers
in their ability to process information and, therefore, to make informed saving decisions.9
We provide a simple extension to the MPV approach by considering that depositors are
4 Ize and Levy Yeyati (2003) provide empirical evidence that the MVP has some explanatory power for the
average level of dollarization across countries. De Nicol´ o et. al (2005) extends this empirical analysis by
considering a broader set of countries.
5 Dollarization hysteresis is observed in several countries with high real exchange rate volatility, e.g. Russia.
The reason of this apparent contradiction with the portfolio approach may be that it is very diﬃcult to get
a sound estimate of the unconditional variances that compose the MVP.
6 An exception is Sturzenegger (1997) who studies the implications of income inequality on currency
substitution, yet with no reference to deposit dollarization.
7 Ag´ enor and Haque (1996) provide an account of informal currency markets.
8 Even large ﬁrms may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to trade with a pool of (well-organized) cambistas.
9 Surely, income diﬀerences can also be important if the income gap between the ﬁnancial expert and the
blacksmith is wide. However, we ﬁnd that in dollarized economies the dollar deposit participation of (many)
ﬁrms and (a lot of) individuals can be taken roughly as having the same importance.
3heterogeneous in their ability to process information and to forecast real returns. In particular,
we assume that depositors receive noisy information and that the amount of noise they
receive is idiosyncratic. It turns out that under these assumptions the individual’s optimal
dollarization ratio follows an AR(1) process, where its degree of persistence is associated to
the ability of the depositor to extract information. In particular, the individual dollarization
ratio will be less (more) persistent and it will respond more (less), on impact, to changes in
the signal, higher (lower) the ability of the depositor to process information. Aggregating
the individual dynamics of depositors we show that ﬁnancial dollarization can be very
persistent, even though at the individual level persistence is moderate, when heterogeneity
across depositors is large
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we brieﬂy explore these issues using
Peruvian and Polish data.10 For reasons explained below, these cases suit nicely the purpose
of illustrating our claim about the interplay between individual heterogeneity and aggregate
persistence. Besides, it gives us an idea of how the dollar deposit market is shared among
various types of depositors.
In section 3 we develop a stylized model where agents face noisy information and diﬀer in
their ability to forecast when taking portfolio decisions. An important result from this setup
is that the dynamics of the individual’s optimal portfolio depends on her prediction errors of
future dollar returns. It turns out that it is optimal for agents to be cautious when modifying
the currency composition of their deposits as there is uncertainty on the quality of the data
agents receive. This caution is reﬂected in portfolios that may adjust in a relatively slow
fashion. Finally, we show that upon aggregation of the individual dollarization decisions it is
possible to generate a very persistent economy-wide dollarization ratio.11
In section 4 we test the empirical hypotheses of the theoretical model and ﬁnd supportive
evidence from aggregate data of three Latin American countries and Poland. Particularly,
the results suggest that the distributions of “forecasting abilities” behind the aggregate
dollarization ratios are very spread. We regard this result as consistent with the idea of
ﬁnancial experts sharing the dollar market with blacksmiths that save in dollars. In section
5 we reformulate the theoretical model in order to reﬂect a diﬀerent source of informational
heterogeneity, and provide further empirical evidence.
Section 6 concludes and gives some policy recommendations. Derivations and complementary
results are shown in the appendix.
10 The ﬁgures used in section 2 come from the Central Bank of Peru and the National Bank of Poland. The
facts discussed there are recorded in the annual reports of these institutions.
11 Our approach is related to other branches of the literature. For instance, Lewbel (1994) uses aggregate
information to test heterogeneity on consumption dynamics whereas Michelacci (2004) explains the high
degree of persistence of output with the cross-sectional heterogeneity of productive ﬁrms.
42 Two illustrative cases
As documented by Savastano (1996), dollarization emerges progressively in response to
macroeconomic instability, particularly high levels of inﬂation, showing a well-deﬁned pattern:
ﬁrst agents replace domestic currency as reserve of value, holding usually dollars outside
the ﬁnancial system (“under the mattress”). Then, the dollar is used in some transactions,
typically involving real estates and durable goods, and eventually some prices are set in dollars.
Most governments later on allow banks to issue deposits in foreign currency to avoid ﬁnancial
disintermediation.12 The actual experience of various countries shows that within a year an
economy can increase its dollarization ratio enormously, see Figures 1(a) and 2(a).
On the other side, episodes of dedollarization (i.e., a sustained reduction in the dollarization
ratio) are not very common and thus there is no well-established pattern in the literature.
Yet, if ever happened, the dedollarization process is likely to be slow. The analysis of these
events, as opposed to the increase of dollarization, provide very useful information about the
way diﬀerent depositors decide the currency composition of their savings and on how they
respond to news coming from the macroeconomic environment.
2.1 Peru in the early 2000’s
Although the Peruvian dollarization experience shares various of the aforementioned features,
it has its own appeal.13 As shown in Figure 1(a), in 1991 (after a four-digit hyperinﬂation in
1990) the ratio was 60% and has remained ﬂuctuating roughly between 65% and 70% for a
decade. Since 2000, it has shown a sustained reduction to about 50% in 2005. Of course, 50%
is still a big number, but there are some interesting facts behind this recent drop.
There are at least two forces driving this decrease. Firstly, after 8 years of announcing inﬂation
targets within a monetary targeting regime (since 1994) and after 5 years of having achieved a
one-digit inﬂation rate, the Central Bank announced the adoption of a fully ﬂedged inﬂation
targeting regime in 2002. This has helped to anchor inﬂation expectations and has reduced
inﬂation and nominal interest rate volatility. Secondly, between 2001 and 2005, the nominal
and real exchange rates have appreciated (6.2% and 5.1%) as a result of a very favorable
foreign environment: increasing terms of trade leading to an export boom and very low
international interest rates. In a nutshell, the real return to holding deposits dollars vis-` a-
vis holding deposits in domestic currency has fallen considerably in the early 2000’s.
Figure 1(b) shows deposit dollarization by type of deposit: demand, savings and a breakdown
of time deposits in certiﬁcates, “CTS” and others. A glimpse of the ﬁgure reveals that both
demand and “CTS” deposits have not reacted to the recent change in the dollar real return
12 See also Kamin and Ericsson (2003), De Nicol´ o et. al (2005) and Levy Yeyati (2006).
13 See Quispe (2000) for a careful historical account of the dollarization experience in Peru.
5Figure 1. Deposit Dollarization in Peru









(a) Dollar deposits to M2
(1990 − 2005)
















Source: Central Bank of Peru.
trend. Demand deposits accounts for about 20% of total deposits and as the most liquid,
almost transactional kind of deposit the ﬂat pattern is justiﬁed. On the other side, the CTS
is the Peruvian version of an unemployment insurance; by law, it is hold exclusively by
individuals and can be claimed only when an individual becomes unemployed. The CTS
deposits have reacted even less than the demand deposits, which is puzzling.
The ﬁgure also shows a moderate downward trend in the savings and other time deposits.
About 80% of the saving and roughly half of the other time deposits are held by individuals.
From 2001 to 2005 both ratios have decreased in about 10%. What is remarkable from Figure
1(b) is the strong reaction of the certiﬁcate of deposits ratio which has fallen in almost 40%,
and with no doubts is driving the fall in the aggregate ratio of Figure 1(a). The interesting
fact is that although the certiﬁcate of deposits have similar term than the CTS and the other
time deposits, they are mainly held by ﬁrms and not individuals.
2.2 Poland towards a market economy
The Polish experience is regarded as the most successful shift from a planned to a market-
oriented economy, and is a thriving example of dedollarization. By the end 1980’s, Poland
was on the verge of a profound economic crisis. The huge distortions on relative prices and
the cumulative ﬁscal deﬁcits, inherited from the years of central planning, induced a rapid
increase in inﬂation that reached its historical maximum of 550% in 1989. In response to
this unstable macroeconomic environment, dollarization ratios increased rapidly, from levels
around 20% in 1985 to a peak of 60% in 1989. This is shown in Figure 2(a).
After the introduction of a series of pro-market reforms and of a stabilization program
6Figure 2. Deposit Dollarization in Poland
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(the so-called “shock-therapy”),14 dollarization ratios dropped to averages of 40% percent
by the end of 1993, hand-to-hand with the reduction of inﬂation (from 500% to 36%). As the
macroeconomic conditions kept improving, additional institutional reforms were put in place.
Notably, in 1997 the National Bank of Poland was granted independence and a well-deﬁned
objective: to guarantee price stability. Dollarization decreased even more reaching by 2001
the level of 18%, comparable with that of developed European economies, as the UK.
A common feature of the Polish experience with the Peruvian one discussed above is the
observed heterogeneity of dollarization dynamics among type of deposits. Figure 2(b) reveals
that by the end of 1993, the diﬀerence between the dollarization ratios of households and
ﬁrms was of the order of 70% for time deposit and 40% for demand deposits. These diﬀerences
remained on the range of 20% for more than 4 years.
2.3 Moral
The diﬀerences between how individuals and ﬁrms decide their portfolio composition are
obvious. Usually ﬁrms have more resources allocated to the management of their funds,
whereas individuals often base their decisions on their experience, those of some neighbors
and their limited access to information. Moreover, the decision-making even within ﬁrms or
within individuals is likely to be dissimilar. Our brief inspection of the Peruvian and Polish
experiences illustrates our main claim that these diﬀerences accounts for much heterogeneity
in dollarization decisions. We next analyze how this translates into persistence.
14 A drastic series of institutional and market reforms were put in place in 1990: the government liberalized
controls of almost all prices, eliminated most subsidies, abolished administrative allocation of resources in
favor of trade, promoted free establishment of private businesses, liberalized the system of international
economic relations, and introduced an internal currency convertibility with a currency devaluation of 32%.
73 A simple model
We use a simple framework to show how the combination of imperfect, noisy information on
real returns of foreign assets, and specially the heterogeneity among market participants can
generate a persistent degree of dollarization.
The model economy is populated by a number of almost identical individuals. They have the
same endowment, which is normalized to one, and the same preferences, but they diﬀer in
their ability to process information and therefore in their expectations on future outcomes.15
Every period agents choose the composition of their portfolio between two assets, one that
oﬀers a ﬁxed real return RP which is denominated in domestic currency (peso from now on)
and the other denominated in dollars with real return RD
t . For the sake of concreteness we






Depositors are risk adverse. Individual i devotes an amount xit of her savings to the dollar
asset and the remaining 1−xit to purchase the asset in pesos. We follow Ize and Levy Yeyati
(2003) in assuming a simple mean-variance utility function. Since the portfolio decision is ex-
ante and based on imperfect information on real returns, the utility for individual i is deﬁned































where ˆ rit+1 and vit+1 are the mean and variance of the excess return Rt that individual i
expects for period t + 1, conditional on information up to period t.





Thus, agents will increase their dollar deposits when they expect a higher real return on this
asset for the same expected variance, or when the expect a lower variance for a given level of
excess of return.
15 Our analysis holds for agents with heterogenous endowments, i.e. wealth/income inequality, as long as they
are correlated with the abilities to process information. See appendix A for details.
16 We have imposed a value of one to the risk aversion parameter in the utility function. This assumption is
harmless to our results.
83.2 Forecasting
In period t, the excess return Rt cannot be perfectly observed. What is publicly known is
a noise-ridden version of Rt, St = Rt + εt where εt ∼ iid(0,σ2). In practice, these variables
can be understood as ex-ante and ex-post diﬀerentials, respectively. As equation (3) reveals,
the only relevant pieces of information for the portfolio decision are the excess return and its
variance. To make things easier, we postulate that each agent focuses directly on forecasting
Rt, and not on forecasting its components (RD
t or RP, which may imply forecasting inﬂation,
depreciation, conﬁscation risk and so on).
Each individual has a forecasting model of the form
rit+1 = µ(1 − ai) + airit + wit+1 wit ∼ iid(0,σ2
w)
St = rit + it it ∼ iid(0,σ2
)
(4)
Since St is a noisy indicator, individual i has ﬁrst to extract the signal rit (i.e., “nowcasting”)
and then forecast its mean and variance to implement (3).
As it can be seen from (4), each individual is given a value of |ai| ≤ 1 drawn from the
distribution F(a), to perform her predictions, and this value alone determines the whole
forecasting model. This is the only source of (cross-sectional) heterogeneity in this setup.
The parameter µ is common to all individuals, indicating that they share the same long-run
forecast. The variances of the disturbances, σ2
w and σ2
, are also assumed to be the same across
individuals.
To be precise, what diﬀerentiates the individuals is the speed with which they adjust their
short-run forecasts as new information becomes available. We interpret this heterogeneity
as diﬀerences in the ability people have to forecast,17 which translates directly to portfolio
diﬀerences among individuals.
Deﬁne vit = E[(rit − ˆ rit)2] as the mean squared error (MSE) of the predictor ˆ rit. Standard
results from the signal extraction literature lead us to the optimal prediction rule18
ˆ rit+1 = µ(1 − a) + a ˆ rit + kit(St − ˆ rit) = µ(1 − a) + a ˆ rit + kitξit (5)
where the forecasted value of rit for next period is the projection of today’s forecasted value
plus a correction, an updating ξit = it+(rit−ˆ rit), that is proportional to the latest prediction
error incurred. The value of kit is given by the (adjusted) ratio of the MSE of ˆ rit to the variance
17 For instance, if the true DGP of Rt is a random walk, then the predictions of those with ai ' 1 will
outperformed that of the others (the true DGP of Rt is irrelevant in deriving our main results).
18 The reader that is familiar with state-space modelling will note that the recursions (5) and (7) below are
straightforward applications of the Kalman ﬁlter. See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000, ch. 2 and ch. 21) and
Harvey and De Rossi (2006) for further details.



















It is clear from equation (7) that viτ+1 = f(viτ). There is a ﬁxed point such that vi = f(vi)19
and moreover, since f0(vi) < 1 it is globally stable: regardless of the initial condition vi0 we
have that viτ → vi and consequently kiτ → ki = aivi(vi + σ2
)−1 as τ → ∞. This means
that as τ becomes larger, i.e. as each individual has performed the signal extraction exercise
a number of times, the updating process deﬁned in (5) and (7) converges to an equilibrium
rule.20 If we assume that this learning process was initialized long before period t then we can
safely treat vit and kit as constants. This fact simpliﬁes the calculations considerably without
compromising our conclusions.
To have a better grasp of the way heterogeneity among agents aﬀects their forecasts (and
portfolios), assume for a moment that µ = 0 and solve (5) recursively to get





It is clear from this geometrically distributed lag expression that diﬀerent draws of a are
associated with diﬀerent ways of weighting the available information (the noisy indicators up
to period t) in order to produce a forecast.21
3.3 Individual dynamics
Using the fact that vit → vi, kit → ki and the optimal updating/forecasting rule (5), the



















19 The ﬁxed point is the positive root of v2






20 Convergence is monotonic (viτ ≥ viτ+1 ≥ vi) because viτ+1 is based on more information than viτ. This
updating scheme is E-stable, in the sense of Evans and Honkapohja (2001) in adaptive learning.
21 As noted in Harvey (1989, ch. 4), the forecasting model converges to the popular Exponential Smoothing
method (ES) as a → 1. However, the scheme explained here is optimal in the sense that it minimizes the
one step ahead MSE, whereas ES is basically ad hoc. We explore this issue further in section 5.
10After plugging (6) into (8), we get










The individual’s dollarization ratio follows a simple AR(1) process. As such, it exhibits
some degree of persistence which depends on the value of ai. Note that a shock in ξit –
an informational update, a news – changes xit on impact, as it changes individual i’s forecast
of Rt and makes her revising her optimal portfolio accordingly. If ξit > 0 (ξit < 0), xit
increases (decreases) as the expected excess of return for holding dollars is higher (lower).
Ceteris paribus, in subsequent periods the expected path of Rt smoothly adjusts towards its
long-term value, and so does the dollar share in the portfolio.
The dynamics of individual dollarization decisions reﬂects the fact that with noisy signals of
returns, individuals have to rely on past information to optimally forecast them, and have to
react with caution to news. To the extent that past portfolio decisions contain past information
of returns, it becomes optimal for individuals to make their dollarization ratios depended on
past dollarization ratios.22
3.4 Aggregate dynamics
In a static world the eﬀects of aggregation are well-known: it tends to smooth away individual
erratic movements and to ﬁll in discontinuities that may be present at the disaggregate level.
Within a dynamic framework, aggregation also increases persistence.23 To see why consider
a group of individuals who hold a small amount of the dollar asset and face an aggregate
shock that makes it more attractive (e.g., a strong real depreciation). According to (9), these
individuals will increase their dollar holdings immediately. But then, this group will also revise
their expectations about future returns in favor of the dollar asset, thereby perpetuating the
impact eﬀect of the shock on aggregate dollarization. Thus, the moderate persistence in the
individual portfolio formation due to the lack of perfect information, summarized in equation
(9), is exacerbated by aggregation.24
Let Xt be the economy-wide dollarization ratio. In Appendix B it is shown that aggregation




ArXt−r + ˜ M + ˜ Ut (10)
22 A similar result but in a diﬀerent setup can be found in Aoki (2003). In that paper the central bank sets
interest rates in an environment with noisy information on output and inﬂation. The optimal policy rule
implies some persistence coming from the cautiousness that the lack of perfect information demands.
23 The classic reference for the econometrics of this eﬀect is Granger (1980), which assumes that F(a) is a
Beta distribution. See also Pesaran (2003) and Zaﬀaroni (2004) for recent developments.
24 See Michelacci (2004) for a similar analysis.
11where the As (s = 1,2,...) are coeﬃcients, ˜ M is a constant and ˜ Ut is an aggregate serially
uncorrelated disturbance. As suggested before, the remarkable fact is that although at the
individual level the dollar share in the portfolio follows an AR(1) process, it becomes AR(∞)
at the aggregate – usually known as a process exhibiting long-memory.
As stressed by Lewbel (1994), the coeﬃcients in (10) are tightly related to the shape of F(a).
In Appendix B it is also shown that they satisfy the recursion
As = ms −
s−1 X
r=1
ms−rAr (s = 1,2,...) (11)
where ms is the s-th moment of the distribution of a, ms =
R
as dF(a). Hence, it is easy to
verify that
mean(a) = m1 = A1
variance(a) = m2 − m2
1 = A2
skewness(a) = (m3 − 3m1m2 + 2m3
1)(m2 − m2
1)−3/2 = (A3 − A1A2)(A2)−3/2
These relations allow us to determine how the distribution of forecasting abilities aﬀects
persistence at the aggregate level. The higher A1, the higher the mean which implies that
the average individual has herself a more persistent behavior, rendering subsequently a more
persistent Xt. On the other side and strikingly, a higher A2 renders also more persistence: the
higher the heterogeneity among individuals, the more persistent the aggregate dollarization
ratio. Finally, as pointed out by Zaﬀaroni (2004), the low frequency behavior of the aggregate
is determined by the shape of the cross sectional distribution as a → 1−. Hence, a distribution
with a heavy left tail (A3 < A1A2), which indicates a higher mass of persistent individuals
(a ≈ 1), would suggest higher aggregate persistence.
It is now clear that this framework can be tested straightforwardly. If the estimates of As
using aggregate data are inconsistent with the notion of various dynamic processes that have
been aggregated into (10), then we are to reject the model.25 The most obvious symptoms
of contradiction would be a non-positive estimate of A2, the variance of F(a),26 or a very
negative value for A1, the mean.
It is important to bear in mind that the amount of information about individual behavior
that can be inferred from aggregate data is unquestionably limited. Diﬀerent assumptions
regarding individual decisions can be found to be consistent with a given observed aggregate
variable. Yet, there are some facts reported below that are supportive to the main hypothesis
of this paper and the predictions of the theoretical model.
25 Or the assumptions behind the aggregation, see Appendix B.
26 Note that A2 = 0 implies a degenerate distribution of a on the point A1, i.e. a model with a representative
agent or identical individuals.
124 Empirical evidence
In this section we test whether the dynamics of the aggregate dollarization ratio in selected
countries can be regarded as coming from the aggregation of heterogeneous depositors. In other
words, we estimate the parameters As in equation (10) and investigate, from the estimated
moments of the underlying distribution F(a), the extent of heterogeneity among participants
in the dollar deposit market.
4.1 Econometric issues and data
Three points are worth mentioning before presenting some results. Firstly and unsurprisingly
every dollarization ratio Xt we considered has a unit root27 and to avoid well-known biases








Appendix B shows that (12) is not only the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced version of (10), but is also the
result of aggregating (9) after ﬁrst-diﬀerentiating. Hence, the coeﬃcients in (12) are indeed
the same as in (10). The disturbance U
†
t is autocorrelated and heteroscedastic28 so robust
inference is required.
Secondly, due to data limitations it is not possible to estimate equation (12) as it stands.
Data are ﬁnite, so a truncation in the lags of the AR(∞) process is unavoidable.
Lastly, if convenient, we consider even richer dynamics than the suggested by our very stylized
theoretical model by introducing a MA(1) component in (12). In practice, this fact has no
other implication for our analysis than to produce better estimates of the As. As noted by
Lewbel (1994), with a MA component present only a ﬁnite number of the moments of F(a)
can be recovered as an inﬁnite autoregression in Xt (or in ∆Xt) cannot be separated from
the MA parameter, say θ. This is a theoretical rather than empirically substantive concern;
as noted earlier, our attempt is not to recover every moment of F(a), but just the ﬁrst few.
We gathered information for Peru and Uruguay (two highly dollarized countries), Mexico and
Poland. Data are quarterly spanning roughly from the mid-1980’s to the mid-2000’s. As it
is customary in the dollarization literature, Xt is measured as the ratio of foreign currency
deposits from the private sector in the domestic banking system to M2.29 This information
27 Results of unit root tests are available upon request to the authors. See also Appendix C.
28 See Pesaran (2003) for further details.
29 A popular alternative deﬁnition of the dollarization ratio discriminate between residents and non-residents,
which includes deposits by residents abroad (Ize and Levy Yeyati, 2003). We did not include this deﬁnition in
our empirical work as the corresponding available time series are shorter for the pool of countries analyzed.
13Table 1. ARIMA models of the deposit dollarization ratio in selected countries
ARIMA model A1 A2 A3 A4 θ A3 − A1A2 ¯ R2
Mexico (1985.Q4 to 2005.Q3, N = 77)
(4,1,0) 0.221∗ 0.199∗ −0.192∗ 0.114∗∗ −0.236∗ 0.221
(0.078) (0.078) (0.072) (0.064) (0.095)
(4,1,1)? 0.480∗ 0.195∗ −0.216∗ 0.251∗ −0.097∗ −0.310∗ 0.261
(0.111) (0.094) (0.063) (0.047) (0.018) (0.086)
Peru (1980.Q1 to 2005.Q3, N = 94)
(2,1,0)? 0.173∗ 0.142∗ −0.024∗∗ 0.200
(0.063) (0.058) (0.013)
(2,1,1) 0.186∗∗ 0.139∗ −0.058 −0.026 0.173
(0.094) (0.065) (0.143) (0.016)
Poland (1985.Q4 to 2002.Q4, N = 69)
(2,1,0)? 0.474∗ 0.113∗ −0.053∗ 0.215
(0.016) (0.052) (0.024)
(2,1,1) 0.476∗ 0.111∗ −0.007 −0.053∗ 0.275
(0.010) (0.049) (0.045) (0.024)
Uruguay (1985.Q1 to 2005.Q3, N = 83)
(2,1,0) 0.218∗ 0.290∗ −0.063∗ 0.153
(0.091) (0.116) (0.029)
(2,1,1)? 0.265∗∗ 0.215∗ −0.093∗ −0.057∗∗ 0.196
(0.147) (0.055) (0.034) (0.033)
Maximum likelihood estimates. Figures in parentheses are robust (consistent) standard errors. * [**] denotes
signiﬁcance at a 5% [10%] level. The standard error of the third central moment A3 − A1A2 was computed
with the delta method. ¯ R2 is the adjusted R2. Regressions include a constant and, if necessary, a few dummy
variables for outlier removal. In all reported equations, Breusch-Godfrey and Jarque-Bera tests suggested
uncorrelated and normally distributed residuals. The preferred speciﬁcations are marked with a ?.
is widely available and our sources are the websites of the various central banks and the
International Financial Statistics database, IFS. The regression with the shortest time series
(Poland) has N = 69 observations; the one with the largest (Peru), N = 94.
4.2 Results
For each country an ARIMA(2,1,0) was ﬁrst ﬁtted. Then, we test for residual autocorrelation
and include further lags until the residuals appear serially uncorrelated. In every case, no
more than 2 lags is needed, but in Mexico when the lag length is 4. For robustness sake
we then include a MA component in the best autoregressive speciﬁcation. Table 1 reports
for each country the best autoregressive model, ARIMA(2,1,1) or ARIMA(4,1,0), and the
corresponding ARIMA(2,1,1) or ARIMA(4,1,1) equations. The column labelled θ contains
the estimated MA coeﬃcient. For each country we have marked our preferred speciﬁcation,
i.e. the more parsimonious model that describes the data suﬃciently well, with a ?.
14A remarkable fact from Table 1 is that the estimates for Peru are close to those of Uruguay,
whereas the Mexican estimates are similar to the Polish. Recall that Peru and Uruguay
are heavily dollarized (above 50%), whereas Mexico and Poland, even though have reported
sizeable dollarization ratios by the early or mid-90’s, have dollarization ratios less than 30%.
There are however, common features among all 4 countries and we will focused on those next.
A ﬁnding that is robust among countries and speciﬁcations within the same country, is that
the coeﬃcients A1 and A2 are signiﬁcantly positive. Recall that A1 is the mean of F(a), which
does not appear to be particularly close to one in any case, and A2 is its variance. Moreover, in
Peru and Uruguay the coeﬃcients are of comparable magnitude, A2 ≈ A1, which means that
the underlying F(a) is very spread, the a’s are fairly heterogeneous. From the preferred model
for Peru we have that A1±2
√
A2 ≈ [−0.60,0.92], whereas in the Uruguayan case this interval
is even wider, A1 ± 2
√
A2 ≈ [−0.66,1.20]. For the Mexican case, A1 ± 2
√
A2 ≈ [−0.40,1.36]
whereas for the Polish, A1 ± 2
√
A2 ≈ [−0.20,1.15]. These estimates imply coeﬃcient of
variations
√
A2/A1 of 2.18 for Peru, 1.75 for Uruguay, 0.91 for Mexico and 0.71 for Poland.
Hence, the highly dollarized economies appear to have a spreader F(a) which is consistent
with the idea of decreasing participation costs as dollarization expands. Yet, even in Mexico
and Poland (where A1 > A2) the underlying heterogeneity is estimated to be high.
From the above intervals it can be seen that the largest mass of depositors has a stationary
behavior, |a| < 1. A more controversial ﬁnding is that some individuals seem to have explosive
dynamics, a > 1. This is, nonetheless, not to be interpreted narrowly as the same depositors
having a > 1 all time periods, but as a mass of individuals having this sort of behavior from
time to time. The same argument applies to the fact that some depositors appear to have
a < 0, which implies an erratic, saw-shaped, individual dollarization pattern.
The estimates of the implied third central moment A3 − A1A2 in each country suggest that
F(a) is skewed to the left. Provided that A1 > 0, a left-skewed F(a) would be expected if
it were the mixture of a mass point above the mean (relatively persistent individuals, those
who change their portfolio slowly) and some individuals with a close to zero (corresponding
to those who change their portfolio quickly). Negative skewness, thus, is consistent with a
ﬁnancial expert sharing the dollar market with a non-expert blacksmith saving in dollars.
5 A reinterpretation
To check the robustness of our results, in this section we slightly modify our theoretical model.
In section 3, the diﬀerences among agents were centered on how fast each adjusts her forecast
(and hence her portfolio) as news become available. We dubbed this diﬀerences as coming
from diﬀerent abilities to forecast. Next, we focused on heterogeneity in the abilities people
have to extract useful signals. We postulate that individuals face idiosyncratic signal-to-noise
15ratios, qi. This rationalizes in a simple manner the fact that those with high qi, the ﬁnancial
experts, are able to extract more information from the noisy indicator St than those with
low qi, the blacksmiths. In contrast to the blacksmiths, the ﬁnancial experts might be able to
distinguish whether changes in St reveal changes in Rt or are just due to noise.
5.1 Reformulating the model
We collapse system (4) to what is known as a local level model,30
rit+1 = rit + wit+1 wit ∼ iid(0,σ2
w)
St = rit + it it ∼ iid(0,σ2
i)
(13)
and now we allow the variance of the noise to vary, σ2
i. The signal-to-noise ratio is qi = σ2
w/σ2
i
and plays a key role in determining how the noisy observations are weighted for signal
extraction (and prediction). The higher is qi the more past observations are discounted in
forecasting the future.
For expositional convenience we deﬁne ˜ vit = vitσ
−2
i . The updating scheme of the MSE of ˆ rit
– formerly equation (7) – and its equilibrium value become
˜ vit+1 =
˜ vit(1 + qi) + qi
˜ vit + 1







whereas the forecasting rule – (5) before – can be written now as
ˆ rit+1 = (1 − ki) ˆ rit + kiSt where ki =
˜ vi
˜ vi + 1
(15)
Given (15) the optimal dollar investment follows the proccess
xit = (1 − ki)xit−1 +

1
˜ vi + 1

St (16)
It is easy to show that ki is increasing in qi,31 which implies that those individuals with high
qi gain more information from the signal each period. More fundamentally, this also implies
that those individuals will have less persistent dollarization ratios. As equation (16) shows,
the higher the ki, the lower the degree of persistence of dollarization ratios. Note as well that a
change on the signal St changes the dollarization ratio on impact, with higher responsiveness
from individuals endowed with a higher ability to extract information.
30 See Harvey (1989, ch. 4) and footnote 21.
31 Since ∂ki/∂qi = ∂ki/∂˜ vi·∂˜ vi/∂qi with ∂ki/∂˜ vi = (˜ vi+1)−2 > 0 and ∂˜ vi/∂qi = 0.5+(qi+2)(q2
i +4qi)−0.5 > 0.
165.2 Aggregation and further econometric issues
With a slight abuse of notation, call ai = 1−ki. Recall now that St = Rt +εt, where εt is an







βrRt−r + ˆ Ut (17)
which as opposed to (10) includes a distributed lag of Rt. This diﬀerence is the consequence
of postulating diﬀerent sources of heterogeneity at the individual level, and has a direct
implication for our analysis so far: if the individual heterogeneity is best approximated by
(13) rather than (4), then the estimates of Table 1 may be biased due to the omission of
relevant variables. Next, we augment the ARIMA models of Table 1 to investigate whether
this presumed omission changes our main conclusions.










where pX and pR are ﬁnite lag lengths. The presence of Rt and its lags in (18) follows directly
from the fact that the individuals in the theoretical model base their decisions exclusively on





















As Rt = RD
t −RP
t , equation (19) encompasses (18) which is a restricted version with βD
r = −βP
r
for every r. For this reason, we will focus on (19) from now on.
An empirical issue that raises with the introduction of the real returns in the aggregate equa-
tions is, precisely, how to measure them. The “true” returns involve expectations of future
macroeconomic variables, which historical data are barely available for the countries in our
analysis. Call iP
t and iD
t the nominal interest rates in domestic currency and US dollars, re-
spectively, δt the nominal depreciation (i.e., the percent change of the nominal exchange rate,
domestic currency per US dollar) and πt the CPI inﬂation. We entertain two measurements




















t )(1 + δt)
1 + πt
− 1
17CPI and nominal exchange data are readily available. For iP
t we use the deposit rate in
domestic currency for Peru, Poland and Uruguay and the saving rate in domestic currency
for Mexico. For iD
t , we found data on the interest rate paid to domestic deposits in dollars
only in the case of Peru and Uruguay. For Mexico and Poland we approximate iD
t with the
deposit rate in the US.32 Our sources are still the central banks and the IFS.
Finally, the presence of a contemporaneous return (19) may rise the possibility of endogeneity
bias. We use a 2SLS procedure to estimate this equation. The instruments are listed in the
note to Table 2. It is worth mentioning that OLS or the exclusion of the contemporaneous
returns did not alter the main results of this robustness check.33
5.3 Results
Table 2 displays the estimation results. To save space we do not report the coeﬃcients of
the returns (as they are not of direct interest for our analysis) but do report an F-statistic
assessing its overall signiﬁcance. We set the lag length pX = 3. This is the best choice for
Mexico; for the other countries, the optimal is pX = 2, but we still set pX = 3 to ensure that
no autoregressive eﬀect is ignored. The choice of pR, reported in the table, responds to the
minimization of the Schwarz criterion.
Recall that by estimating the augmented equations we are assessing whether the results of
Table 1 are robust. So, are they robust? In general they are. A quick comparison of the
estimates in Table 2 with those in Table 1 reveals that due to the presence of the returns,
the ﬁt of the various equations increases, but the estimates of A1, A2 and A3 − A1A2 do not
change much. The notable exception to this pattern is the Mexican case when the returns are
measured in the ex-post manner, as A1 losses statistical signiﬁcance. However, the main claim
of the previous sections still holds, qualitatively and almost quantitative: the heterogeneity of
decision-makers that underlies the aggregate dollarization ratios is high, and this fact leads
to aggregate dollarization persistence.
6 Concluding remarks
In countries with high dollarization ratios, participation in the dollar deposit market has
become massive. Financial deregulation, liberalization, innovation and informal currency
32 Unfortunately we could not ﬁnd time series long enough of country risk to have a better measure of RD
t in
these two countries. The estimation results, though, were robust when we considered the LIBOR rate (in
US dollars, at various terms) instead of the US deposit rate.
33 We did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant cointegration relationship between Xt, RP
t and RD
t or between Xt and Rt
to treat (18) or (19) as an error correction model. There are some structural breaks in our 20 year data
span that may explain this failure. Consistently with this, the levels of the returns did not appear to have
enough explanatory power in the equations of Table 2.
18Table 2. Augmented equations
A1 A2 A3 A3 − A1A2 H0 : β = 0 pR ¯ R2
Mexico (1985.Q4 to 2005.Q3, N = 77)
ex-ante 0.291∗ 0.202∗ −0.273∗ −0.331∗ 11.50∗ 2 0.554
(0.096) (0.066) (0.092) (0.113) [0.000]
ex-post 0.129 0.287∗ −0.240∗ −0.278∗ 22.56∗ 2 0.565
(0.108) (0.089) (0.080) (0.091) [0.000]
Peru (1980.Q1 to 2005.Q3, N = 89)
ex-ante 0.242∗ 0.195∗ 0.003 −0.047∗ 9.086∗ 3 0.435
(0.043) (0.047) (0.053) (0.015) [0.000]
ex-post 0.501∗ 0.138∗∗ −0.027 −0.069∗∗ 30.85∗ 2 0.649
(0.098) (0.083) (0.068) (0.036) [0.000]
Poland (1985.Q4 to 2005.Q3, N = 68)
ex-ante 0.449∗ 0.132∗ −0.002 −0.059∗ 1.638 3 0.275
(0.043) (0.058) (0.049) (0.022) [0.203]
ex-post 0.586∗ 0.164∗ −0.123 −0.096∗ 2.402∗∗ 4 0.394
(0.077) (0.070) (0.160) (0.043) [0.099]
Uruguay (1985.Q1 to 2005.Q3, N = 80)
ex-ante 0.252∗ 0.280∗ −0.109 −0.070∗∗ 3.153∗ 3 0.124
(0.104) (0.114) (0.140) (0.038) [0.049]
ex-post 0.267∗ 0.349∗ −0.073 −0.093∗∗ 2.189 2 0.152
(0.103) (0.117) (0.143) (0.047) [0.119]
2SLS estimates. Instruments for RD
t and RP
t (and for the ex-ante RD
t−1 and RP
t−1) are oil prices changes, US
GDP growth and lagged values of these and the R-variables. Figures in parentheses are robust (consistent)
standard errors. * [**] denotes signiﬁcance at a 5% [10%] level. Figures in the H0 : β = 0 column are
F-statistics, p-values shown in braces. Lag length pR was chosen to minimize the Schwarz criterion. For
Peru, Poland and Uruguay, we set A3 = 0 to compute the third central moment and its standard deviation.
Diagnostic tests suggested well-behaved residuals. All regressions include a constant.
markets have allowed a very heterogenous group of agents – from a large ﬁrm that uses
state-of-art portfolio management techniques to an uninformed individual, a blacksmith, who
bases their portfolio decisions simply on their own experience and limited information – to
participate in the same market. This paper shows that such an heterogeneity turns out to be
enough to generate persistence in dollarization ratios upon aggregation. Empirical evidence
from three Latin American countries and Poland supports this claim.
The presence of heterogeneity in individual dollarization decisions has interesting policy
implications. Ize and Levy Yeyati (2003) conclude sensibly that a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for dedollarization is higher exchange rate ﬂexibility. In our setup this condition
is not suﬃcient (though we reckon it is necessary), as there may exist a mass of individuals
that do not respond at all to such a volatility. This makes a case for a more active policy on
improving the communication skills of the central bank, in order to better convey its policy
of more ﬂexible exchange rates and possibly its commitment to price stability to a broader
19set of agents, specially to those regarded as uninformed. In this way the policymaker would
be contributing to reduce individual heterogeneity and thus aggregate persistence.
This policy implication is particularly relevant for developing economies with an inﬂation
targeting regime or for those evaluating moving towards this regime, as it heavily relies upon
transparency and communication strategies. Our analysis suggests that the beneﬁts of the
such a policy regime in reducing dollarization may be condemned to be limited, unless the
central bank eﬀectively communicates the implications and beneﬁts of such a regime to the
less informed segment of participants in the dollar market.
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21A The distribution of endowments and abilities
Our results were derived under the assumption that agents are homogenous in their
endowments. In particular, we restricted the analysis to the case where each agent has an
endowment of size one. Here, we show that our results hold for a more general case, one
in which agents have diﬀerent size of endowments, but where the distribution of abilities
(a) across agents is correlated with that of the endowments. We regard this correlation as
plausible in reality.
Consider equation (9). For the sake of argument, set µ = 0 and let us assume that aggregate
income is equal to one and that there are two agents in the economy: one with ability a1 and
income n1 and the other with ability a2 and income n2 = 1 − n1. Then,






ξit for i = 1,2 (A1)
After generating a common lag polynomial for both process we have that














The aggregate level of dollar deposits, which coincides with the aggregate dollarization ratio,
is Xt = n1x1t + n2x2t. Aggregate the equations in (A2) to get













Deﬁne ˜ ξit = niai(vi + σ2
)−1ξit for i = 1,2. Then, (A3) boils down to
Xt = (a1 + a2)Xt−1 + a1a2Xt−2 + ˜ ξ1t − a2˜ ξ1t−1 + ˜ ξ2t − a1˜ ξ2t−1 (A4)
We have that the aggregate dollarization ratio follows an ARMA(2,1) process. This simple
example can be generalizad to the case of N AR(1) process (hence N ability or endowment
levels); in such a case the aggregate dollarization ratio follows an ARMA(N∗, N∗−1) process,
where N∗ ≤ N. We can increase the number of agents involved by simply replicating
the individual behavior for a given ability a an arbitrary number of times. Therefore,
the aggregation results derived in Appendix B go through under the assumption that the
distribution of endowments is correlated to that of the abilities to process information. When
N → ∞, we get the limiting case exposed in Appendix C. The derivations in this appendix
applies to the alternative version of our model that led to equation (16).
22B Aggregation
The derivations herein follow Lewbel (1994) closely. To alleviate the notation we drop the i
subscript in this appendix.
B.1 Equations (10) and (11)
Consider equation (9),
xt = axt−1 + m + ut (B1)
where m = µ(1 − a)v−1 and ut = a(v + σ2
)−1ξt depend on a. Since by construction ξt is a
sequence of serially uncorrelated shocks, so is ut. However, ut is correlated across individuals.
Let E be the expectation operator across individuals, E[z] =
R
z dF(a), such that Xt = E[xt],
M = E[m] and Ut = E[ut]. Aggregation of (B1) renders
Xt = E[axt−1] + M + Ut (B2)
Deﬁne a random variable αs, a scalar As = E[αs] and a recursion αs+1 = (αs−As)a with initial
condition α1 = a. Note that for s > 1 the above recursion implies that αs = as−
Ps−1
r=1 as−rAr.
After taking E expectations we get equation (11) in the main text, where ms = E[as] is the
s-th moment of the distribution of a. Note also that
E[αsxt−s] = AsXt−s + E[(αs − As)xt−s]
= AsXt−s + E[(αs − As)axt−(s+1)] + E[(αs − As)m] + E[(αs − As)ut−s]
= AsXt−s + E[αs+1xt−(s+1)] + cov(αs,m) + cov(αs,ut−s) (B3)
where cov(αs,m) is the cross-sectional covariance of αs and m which is time-invariant. On
the other side, cov(αs,ut−s) is the cross-sectional covariance of αs and ut−s which is time
dependent, but as this dependency comes from ξt, it is serially uncorrelated.













r=1 cov(αr,ut−r) and ˜ V = E[Vt], where E is the expectation operator over time.
Deﬁne also ˜ M = M +
P∞
r=1 cov(αr,m) + ˜ V and ˜ Ut = Ut + Vt − ˜ V . Then, after plugging (B4)
into (B2) we get equation (10) in the main text, Xt =
P∞
r=1 ArXt−r + ˜ M + ˜ Ut, where ˜ Ut is
23serially uncorrelated.34 The underlying assumptions behind the aggregate equation (10) are





Consider now equation (B1) in ﬁrst diﬀerences
∆xt = a∆xt−1 + ut − ut−1 (B5)





Ar∆Xt−r + Vt − Vt−1 (B6)










which corresponds to the ﬁrst-diﬀerence version of (10). The new aggregate error U
†
t is serially
correlated and the coeﬃcients are the same as those in (10).
B.3 Equation (17)
All the results derived above go through in aggregating (16). Note that this equation can be
written as xt = axt−1 + bSt where a and b are individual speciﬁc coeﬃcients whereas St is an








Call β0 = E[b], βr = cov(αr,b), ˆ Ut =
P∞
r=0 βrεt−r and recall that St = Rt + εt. Further
mechanical manipulation leads to (17). The aggregate disturbance ˆ Ut is serially correlated.
34 Pesaran (2003) shows that it is heteroscedastic, though.
24C A brief note on fractional integration
Consider the univariate dynamic model
Φ(L)(1 − L)
dXt = Θ(L)ηt (C1)
where L is the lag operator, ηt ∼ iid(0,σ2
η) and d is the diﬀerencing parameter. When d = 0,
Xt is stationary and follows an ARMA process, Φ(L)Xt = Θ(L)ηt. When d = 1, Xt has a
unit root and hence follows an ARIMA process, Φ(L)∆Xt = Θ(L)ηt. More generally, when d
takes non-integer values, Xt is said to be a fractionally integrated ARMA (ARFIMA) process.
When d ∈ (0,0.5], the autocovariance function of Xt declines hyperbolically to zero, making
Xt a stationary long-memory process. For d > 0.5, Xt is non-stationary (has inﬁnite variance).
Granger (1980) has shown that under particular assumptions about F(a) – the distribution
of individual autoregressive coeﬃcients – the aggregation of AR(1) processes like (9) leads
to (C1).35 In our empirical application, we simply imposed d = 1 and proceeded. If d < 1
truly, then we would have over-diﬀerentiated the data, with possible negative eﬀects in our
statistical inference.
Table B1 displays estimates of d and tests H0 : d = 0 and H0 : d = 1. We did not ﬁnd enough
evidence to reject H0 : d = 1 whereas H0 : d = 0 is systematically rejected.
Table B1. Estimated fractional integration parameter in dollarization ratios
H0 : d = 0 H0 : d = 1
ˆ d t-stat p-value t-stat p-value
Mexico 0.825 2.376 0.0491 0.505 0.6294
Peru 0.932 3.883 0.0037 0.282 0.7843
Poland 0.955 4.605 0.0025 0.219 0.8333
Uruguay 0.788 2.485 0.0378 0.667 0.5236
The estimation method is that of Geweke and Porter-Hudak (known as GPH). The asymptotic standard error
of ˆ d is π2/6 which is used to compute the t-statistics and p-values. Both tests (H0 : d = 0 and H0 : d = 1) are
two-tailed. See Baillie (1996) for a review of ARFIMA modelling and for critics to the GPH estimator.
35 See also Baillie (1996) and Zaﬀaroni (2004).
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